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NOTES
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY AND FREE TRADE IN THREE
FEDERAL SYSTEMS
The notion of "states' rights" as an antidote for the threat of government is
by no means peculiar to the politics of the United States. In the past few years,
significant constitutional questions have arisen in the three major federal sys-
temg, the United States, Canada, and Australia, in connection with federal
legislation attempting to deal with national economic problems. In all three
systems important federal acts have been invalidated by the courts of last
resort on grounds connected with the limits inter se of the powers of the federal
and state governments. As a result of this development in the United States,
various groups are now seeking a redistribution of federal and state powers,
either by effecting a change in the policy of the judiciary," by further attempts
I Such a plan would attempt to secure the overruling of such cases as Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918), Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922), and United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. i (x936), which established the doctrine of an implied prohibition against in-
direct influence upon the internal policies oi states through the exercise of existing federal
powers. Cf. Victoria v. Commonwealth of Australia, 28 C.L.R. 399 (i926) (federal govern-
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at federal legislation,2 or by constitutional amendment.3 However, a brief
examination of the constitutional developments leading to the invalidation of
the acts in all three countries indicates that the basic reason for their rejection
is not "states' rights"; but rather that "states' rights" is a convenient means of
expressing a judicial conception of governmental policy. The rejection has
come as a result of the gradual enactment into law, by judicial legislation, of
the economic doctrine of laissezfaire. This development has been accompanied
by a failure on the part of courts to distinguish some essentially personal aspects
of "property" and "civil rights" from a number of economic aspects which are
almost totally unrelated. Unless this basic confusion of economic with per-
sonal interests is resolved, it becomes evident that a simple redistribution of
federal and state powers will accomplish either too much or too little. It is true
that under the present alignment of powers there are a number of economic
relations which should be regulated but which are immune to regulation. A
redistribution of powers will be effective only to the extent that it makes their
regulation possible. But if on the one hand an effective redistribution of powers
is accomplished without making any distinction between the economic and the
personal aspects of the interests which are to be regulated, an encroachment
upon essentially personal interests may result. On the other hand, if this en-
croachment is avoided by limiting the power to regulate without reference to
the distinction between the economic and personal aspects of property inter-
ests, the power will be insufficient to secure the necessary regulation of eco-
ment has power to grant money to the states on such terms and conditions as it sees fit). The
indirect control of state policies through conditional grants-in-aid has led to serious discontent
in the less prosperous Australian states. See Australia: Problems of Federation, 24 Round
Tab. 639 (i934); The Case for Secession of Western Australia (1934).
The plan would also involve expansion of the commerce power: e.g., the elimination of the
"manufacturing is not commerce" doctrine (United States v. E. C. Knight Co., i56 U.S. z
(1895); cf. Nat'l Lab. Rel. Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 615 (r937); and the
overruling of Railroad Ret. Bd. v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). See Corwin, The Com-
merce Power and the States (1936).
' For example, further legislation following the pattern of the Webb-Kenyon act might
be attempted to protect state legislation on child labor, minimum wages, and similar subjects,
following the decisions in Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. I.C. R. Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 277 (1937),
and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 57 Sup. Ct. 578 (1937). See 25 Georgetown L.J. 671(1937).
'A representative proposal is that of Dean Lloyd K. Garrison, discussed in The Constitu-
tion and the Future, 85 New Repub. 328 (1936); another, that of Senator Costigan, S. J. Res.
3 (Jan. 1935). It is understood that the former is being redrafted.
In general, proposed amendments would give Congress power over matter which the states
cannot control because the resulting increase in production costs would tend to drive out pro-
ducers. In addition, some groups propose control over (i) matters which the states tend to
regulate insufficiently-e.g., control of corporate management; relief of debtors-and (2)
matters which cannot be handled by single states either because of lack of financial resources
or because of the geographical extent of the projects-e.g., large public works; agricultural re-
settlement; conservation of natural resources.
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nomic interests. The problem, therefore, is that of achieving in a federal sys-
tem a distribution of. powers which will permit effective control of economic
interests and yet require essentially personal interests to be left intact. It is a
problem of destroying laissez faire without disturbing the basically democratic
character of the federal state.
The docfrine of laissez faire has been made part of the basic law of Canada
and the United States by including both economic and personal interests within
the protection granted to "liberty," "property," and "civil rights"; and by
dividing the authority to deal with economic matters transcending state lines
between federal and state governments, so as to make control possible only by
cooperation. In Canada and in the United States notions of "property" and
"civil rights" have come to include both personal and business interests. There
is a close parallel between the development of due process in the United States
and the development in Canada of exclusive provincial power to deal with
"property and civil rights." In both cases the development has been from a
notion of "property and civil rights" meaning security of person and possessions
to a notion of "property" which also includes expectations of gain from business
transactions, and a notion of "liberty" or "civil rights" which includes freedom
to make business arrangements. On this point, the contrast of Australia with
Canada and the United States is striking, principally because an Australian
constitutional provision for industrial arbitration has been liberally construed.
Nevertheless in Australia, as in Canada and the United States, there are certain
national economic problems with which no one government is permitted to deal.
In respect to these problems, despite substantially differing constitutional pro-
visions, the three federal governments are in closely analogous positions. In
the United States, the freedom of interstate trade from local "burdens" and the
freedom of local transactions from federal regulation combine with the due
process clauses to prevent either state or federal control of businesses which
must compete for interstate markets.4 Similarly, in Canada, the powers to
regulate "trade and commerce" and "property and civil rights" are divided
between the dominion and the provinces, respectively, and with the same
result. In Australia, a constitutional prohibition against restriction of inter-
state trade and commerce has been held to apply to the federal government as
well as to the states, and has been so construed as to prevent regulation of
interstate marketing. These results have been brought about by two courts,
the Supreme Court of the United States and the Judicial Committee of the
4 Thus New York could set a minimum price to be paid to producers of commodities in
New York (Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (I934)); but could not prevent local dealers
from purchasing at lower prices from out-of-state producers. Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511
(1935). Yet the federal government could not regulate the prices paid to out-of-state pro-
ducers so as to protect the New York market. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935). See Sholley, Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 556 (1936).
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Privy Council in England,s through the interpretation of written constitutions
whose terms are capable of bearing several constructions. In contrast with
these, we shall examine the development of significant parts of the constitution
of Australia, insofar as its interpretation has been within the power of the High
Court of Australia.
CANADA
The constitution of Canada is the British North America Act of i867 .6 The
provisions most significant for this discussion are found in sections 91 and 92
which define, respectively, the powers of the Dominion Parliament and of the
provincial legislatures. Section 91(2) gives the Parliament the power
.... to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation
to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusive-
ly to the Legislatures of the Provinces, and for greater Certainty, but not so as to re-
strict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that
(notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the
Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects
next herein-after enumerated; that is to say,-.... (2) The Regulation of Trade and
Commerce ..... And any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects
enumerated in this Section shall not be deemed to come within the Class of Matters of
a local or private Nature comprised in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects
by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces.
In section 92(13) and (i6) it is provided that
In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters
coming within the Classes of Subjects next herein-after enumerated; that is to say,-
.... (13) Property and Civil Rights in the Province ..... (16) Generally all Matters
of a merely local or private Nature in the Province.
It is apparent that the manner in which these provisions are to be construed
is of the greatest importance, in view of the many ambiguities of section 91.
It has been said that the act is to be construed as any ordinary statute; that
the fact that the act was enacted in 1867 must be borne in mind and effect given
to the intent of Parliament as of that time.7 It has also been said that the act
".... . planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within
its natural limits."8 In accordance with the former view, it might be expected
s Final interpretation of the Canadian constitution lies with the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council, by the Judicial Committee Act, z844, and the Colonial Laws Validity Act,
865, 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63. Appeals on questions of federal-state relations may occur only with
the consent of the High Court of Australia; all other constitutional questions, however, may
be appealed to the Privy Council. See note 75 infra.
6,30 & 3i Vict., c. 3.
7 Bank of Toronto v. Lambe, 12 App. Cas. 575, 579 (x887); Kennedy, Some Aspects of
Canadian and Australian Constitutional Law, xS Corn. L. Q. 345 (1930).
8 Edwards v. Att'y Gen'l for Canada, [i93o] A.C. 124, 136, holding women eligible for ap-
pointment to the senate of Canada, even though at common law in 1867 women were not
eligible for public office. Cf. Naim v. Univ. of St. Andrews, [i9og] A.C. 147, holding women
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that interpretation would tend to follow rather strictly the views of the framers
of the act, especially if these views were adopted in the early decisions. Or, in
accordance with the latter view, it might be expected that interpretation would
tend to adapt the powers of government to new conditions as they arose. In
fact neither course has been followed. This can be illustrated by tracing the
shift of the residual power from the dominion to the provinces through a shifting
interpretation of (a) the "peace, order, and good government" clause of sec-
tion 91; (b) the "trade and commerce" and "property and civil rights" clauses
of sections 91 and 92; and (c) the treaty power conferred by section 132. The
most recent expression of all these developments is to be found in the "New
Deal" cases;9 but it will be well to preface the discussion of these cases with a
separate consideration of each line of development.
ThE RESIDUAL POWER
It has often been said that the Canadian scheme of government differs from
that of the United States in two ways; first, in that the powers not expressly
granted to the provinces by section 92 are reserved to the dominion by section
gi, in contrast with the provisions of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States; and secondly, in that the powers of the dominion and
of the provinces exhaust all possible powers of government, so that no act can
be ultra vires both the dominion and the provinces, while in the United States
some powers are reserved to the people to be exercised only by constitutional
amendment. 0 However, even assuming that this was once true, the cases would
now be difficult to reconcile on such an assumption. The residual power of
the dominion to make laws for the "peace, order, and good government of
Canada" has become an instrument to be used only temporarily, and then only
in times of great national emergency, the crisis in trade of 1932-35 not being
such an instance. The parts of "trade and commerce" comprised by labor re-
lations and the marketing of products have become purely matters of "prop-
erty and civil rights in the provinces." Further, the power conferred by sec-
tion 132 to enact legislation necessary and proper for performing the obligations
of Canada or any of its provinces, as part of the British Empire, arising under
treaties between the Empire and foreign countries, has lost its meaning since
the Statute of Westminster, 1931." Canada now has national status, and treaty
not to be "persons" eligible to vote at an election under a statute of i868. In the Edwards case,
Lord Sankey said the that constitution should be liberally construed except as to the distribu-
tion of dominion and provincial powers, which should be construed strictly.
9 See p. 628, and notes 50-62 infra.
10 1 Bryce, American Commonwealth 307-8 (1921); Lefroy, Law of the Canadian Constitu-
tion, 28 Can. L.J. 353 (1892); McGillivray, Dominion and Provincial Powers under the British
North America Act of 1867, 13 Ill. L. Rev. Soo (i9,9). See also Atty' Gen'l for Ontario v.
Att'y Gen'l for the Dominion, [I912] A.C. 57i, 581.
't 22 & 23 Geo. V, c. 4.
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agreements are imposed upon Canada not by the Empire but by the dominion
parliament.X2
The power of the dominion parliament to pass laws for the "peace, order,
and good government of Canada" was first fully reviewed in the case of Russell
v. The Queen.'3 In upholding the Canada Temperance Act of 1878, the Privy
Council held that laws designed for the promotion of public order, safety, or
morals belonged to the subject of "public wrongs" rather than "civil rights,"
and consequently were not within any of the classes of subjects assigned to the
provinces by section 92. After this decision, provincial liquor legislation should
have been impossible. But the next year, an Ontario liquor act was upheld as
within provincial powers, the Privy Council deciding that "subjects which in
one aspect and for one purpose fall within section 92 .... may in another
aspect and for another purpose, fall within section 9I."14 In 1885 a dominion
liquor license act was held ultra vires without opinion;5 but eleven years later
a provincial local option law was held valid only insofar as it did not conflict
with a dominion act of 1886.x6 The apparent inconsistencies of these decisions
were not cleared up by a still later decision that the Russell case stood for the
proposition that the regulation of liquor traffic lay outside provincial powers. 7
At last, however, it was recognized that in the Russell case the dominion was
acknowledged to have the power of overriding provincial legislation in a field
which was within the competence of the province, where treatment on a national
scale was desirable for the "peace, order, and good government of Canada."
Thus in the Lemieux Act casex8 the Judicial Committee had to meet the issue,
and was forced to insult the Canadian people in order to avoid either over-
ruling the Russell case or conceding that the dominion residual power extended
to the enactment of laws for the mediation of labor disputes. It was said that
at the time of the first temperance act the evil of intemperance must have be-
come such a national calamity that an emergency existed, as in the case of a
plague; and that the Russell case stood merely for an emergency power. The
,2Re Aerial Navigation, [1932] A.C. 54 (control of aviation, held, within the powers of the
dominion by virtue of the convention relating to aerial navigation adopted at Paris in i9x9);
In re Regulation and Control of Radio in Canada, [1932] A.C. 304 (control of radio communi-
cation under a convention adopted after 1931, hed, within the powers of the dominion because
not within any of the enumerated powers of the provinces).
" 7 App. Cas. 829 (1882).
14Hodge v. The Queen, 9 App. Cas. 117, 130 (1883).
Is Dominion Liquor License Acts, 1883-84, 4 Cart. 342n. (i885).
,6Liquor Prohibition Appeal, Att'y Gen'l for Ontario v. Att'y Gen'l for the Dominion,
[896] A.C. 348, 362 (following the Russell case on the ground of the "peace, order, and good
government" clause). But cf. Brewers Ass'n. v. Att'y Gen'l for Ontario, [2897] A.C. 231;
Att'y Gen'l for Manitoba v. Manitoba Licence Holders Ass'n, [2902] A.C. 73 (provincial
licensing and prohibition acts, held, valid).
17 Att'y Gen'l for Canada v. Att'y Gen'l for Alberta, [x916], i A.C. 588, 595.
18 Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396, 412.
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same notion that the overriding power of the dominion applied only to cases
of emergency had previously been put in more politic terms in a case holding
invalid an act to control combines.'9 However, the soundness of this "emer-
gency" interpretation of the initial clause of section 91 is rendered questionable
by the previously accepted construction of the remainder of the section. The
classes of subjects assigned exclusively to the provinces by section 92 are
described in the final clause of section 91 as comprising a "class of matters of a
local or private nature. ' '2° This emphasis on the local and private character of
the subjects relegated to the provinces by the constitution is strengthened by
the remarks of Lord Sankey in the Aeronautics case: ...... the real object
of the Act was to give the central government those high functions and almost
sovereign powers by which uniformity of legislation might be secured on all
questions which were of common concern to all the Provinces as members of a
constituent whole.'2I Thus, even accepting Lord Sankey's earlier statement in
the Edwards case22 that the distribution of dominion and provincial powers
should be strictly construed, it is difficult to see why-except for the sake of
laissez faire-the distribution of powers must be construed strictly against the
dominion. Yet the residual power of the dominion is now in practice nothing
but a power to implement the enumerated powers of section 91 by means of
ancillary legislation.3 It can be seen that this fate of the "peace, order, and
good government" clause of the constitution of Canada parallels closely that of
the "general welfare" clause in the United States, following the decision in the
AAA case2 4 that the power to spend money for the general welfare is limited
to the furtherance of objects which are within the scope of some other powers
expressly conferred upon the federal government by the constitution.
THE COMMERCE POWER
Following a line of development similar to that of the residual power, the
unqualified grant of dominion power over trade and commerce in section 91 (2)
has been restricted more drastically by judicial interpretation than have the
commerce clauses of the American and Australian constitutions, even though
19 In re Board of Commerce Act 1919, [1922] 1 A.C. 191. Cf. Fort Frances Pulp & Paper
Co. v. Manitoba Free Press, [1923] A.C. 695 (emergency war measure).
"0 The phrase "class of matters of a local or private nature" was first thought to refer to
§ 92(16) alone. Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons, 7 App. Cas. 96, ioS (i8i). But this inter-
pretation would require an odd reading of the term; and it was later held that the clause refers
to all the sub-heads of § 92. Att'y Gen'l for Ontario v. Att'y Gen'l for Canada, [1896] A.C.
348, 359-60.
"Re Aerial Navigation, [1932] A.C. 54, 70-71.
-Edwards v. Att'y Gen'l for Canada, [193o] A.C. 124, 136.
23 See note 48 infra.
'4 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. i (1936). Cf. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States,
U.S. Sup. Ct. (May 3, 1937) (processing tax on coconut oil for benefit of Philippine Islands,
hldd, constitutional).
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both of the latter are in terms restricted to matters of "interstate" commerce. 5
The result is that matters in the Canadian provinces now have greater im-
munity from regulation than matters in the American states. The constitu-
tional powers of the provinces have nominally been increased, but not their
actual ability to regulate economic matters transcending provincial lines, as
will appear later. 6 It has been said that the power over trade and commerce
must necessarily be restricted in order to afford scope for the powers given
exclusively to the provinces; since if taken in their widest sense the words
"regulation of trade and commerce" would authorize legislation by the do-
minion on matters enumerated in section 92, and would encroach upon local
matters in the provinces.27 The necessity for restriction of the power was found
in the apparent "repugnancy" between the dominion power to regulate trade
and commerce and the provincial power to regulate property and civil rights.
It was said that in cases of "repugnancy" sections 9i and 92 must be read to-
gether, and the language of one interpreted, and when necessary, modified by
that of the other.25 This doctrine is difficult to interpret in the light of the
non obstante clause of section 91.29 This clause has been held to confer overriding
power upon the dominion in respect to the regulation of banking under section
91(15); SO that a dominion law relating to warehouse receipts taken by a bank
was valid even though it affected "civil rights" by varying the legal effect of
such receipts in the province.3o It has been held that dominion legislation, so
long as it strictly relates in some way to the subjects enumerated in section 9I,
is of paramount authority even though it encroaches upon matters assigned to
25 "The Congress shall have power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Parliament
shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good
government of the Commonwealth with respect to: (i) Trade and commerce with other coun-
tries, and among the states." Com. Aust. Const. Act, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 12, § 51 (i) (1900).
26 Kennedy, "Law and Custom in the Canadian Constitution," Essays in Constitutional
Law (i934). Provincial legislation on marketing is invalid if it affects trade and commerce
beyond provincial boundaries. Lawson v. Interior Tree Fruit Committee, [I93i] Can. S.C.R.
357. Hence the increased powers of the provinces are of little use. See p. 63o infra.
27 Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons, 7 App. Cas. o6, 107, 112 (i88i). Note that in this
case the final clause of § 91 was thought in its grammatical construction to refer only to § 92
(i6); whereas the proper construction was decided in a later case to be different. See note 20
supra.
28 Id. at o9.
'9" .... it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive
Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the
Classes of Subjects next herein-after enumerated .......
30 Tennant v. Union Bank of Canada, [1894] A.C. 31. See also Att'y Gen'l for British
Columbia v. Att'y Gen'l for Canada, [1924] A.C. 222, upholding a dominion tax on whiskey
brought in by the province for its public institutions. Sec. 125 of the constitution provides
that no property of Canada or any province shall be subject to taxation; but § 91 (3) gives the
dominion power to raise money by any mode or system of taxation.
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the provincial legislatures by section 92, and even though the dominion legis-
lation is only ancillary to legislation directly within the enumerated subjects.3X
The overriding power of the dominion has been held to enable the dominion
parliament to deal with local and private matters in cases where such legisla-
tion is necessarily incidental to the exercise of enumerated powers.3 2
In spite of these declarations of the principles of interpretation, it was held
in the Lemieux Act case33 that section 91(2) applies only to the regulation of
"general" trade and commerce, and not to "local" matters like the mediation
and arbitration of industrial disputes. This result may have been reached partly
in reliance upon the Board of Commerce Act case3 4 in which it was said that the
dominion could use its trade and commerce power only in support of a general
power which the dominion legislature possessed independently; a notion which
was repudiated3s several years after the decision of the Lemieux Act case. How-
ever, the result was also based partly on the ground that the trade and com-
merce power was not meant to have a wide scope, because other subheads of
section 91 include matters which could also fall within a broad meaning of
trade and commerce. Hence, especially since the provinces have the exclusive
right to deal with property and civil rights, the trade and commerce power is to
be restricted to "general" regulations.36 This notion that the specification of
such matters as banking, bills of exchange, or navigation and shipping in other
subheads of section 91 restricts the generality of the power conferred by section
91(2) is apparently based upon the rule of construction that specific statements
limit the scope of general declarations. But in view of the initial language of
section 91, the function of the subheads is to make specific but not to restrict
the generality of the "peace, order, and good government" clause. It is straining
the construction to hold that these subheads, which are coordinate, are intended
to restrict the generality of one another-especially since the language of sec-
tions 91 and 92 and the declarations of the framers of the British North America
Act seem to indicate that the primary distinction between the two sections is
not in terms of the subject matter of the powers, which may overlap, but in
terms of the local or national scope of the problems to be handled.37 Further,
the "repugnancy" between the regulation of "trade and commerce" and of
31 Assignment for Benefit of Creditors Case, Att'y Gen'l for Ontario v. Att'y Gen'l for
Canada, [1894] A.C. i89. It makes no difference whether the dominion legislation is prior or
subsequent to theprovincial. L'Union St. Jacques v. Belisle, L.R. 6 P.C. 31 (187 4); Att'y Gen'l
for Ontario v. Att'y Gen'l for the Dominion, [1896] A.C. 348, 366-67.
31 Att'y Gen'l for Ontario v. Att'y Gen'l for the Dominion, [1896] A.C. 348, 360.
33 Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396.
34 In re Board of Commerce Act igig, [1922] 1 A.C. 191.
3s Proprietary Articles Trade Ass'n v. Att'y Gen'l for Canada, [193i] A.C. 3x0.
36 Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [i925] A.C. 396, 409.
37 See i Hardinge, The Fourth Earl of Carnarvon 305 ff. (1925) (explanation of the purpose
of the framers, made in a speech on the occasion of the second reading of the British North
America Bill, Feb. ig, 1867).
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"property and civil rights," which is the occasion of the difficulty, is not a real
inconsistency. The only way in which inconsistency can be found is by identify-
ing the transactions of trade and commerce with property and civil rights. Thus
the "necessity" for restricting the power over trade and commerce to "general"
trade and commerce is merely the "necessity" for achieving laissezfaire.
It has been said that the regulation of general trade and commerce includes
"political arrangements in regard to trade, . . :. regulation of trade in matters
of interprovincial concern, and may perhaps include general regulations of trade
affecting the whole Dominion, but it does not comprehend the power to regu-
late by legislation the contracts of a particular business or trade .... in a
single province."3s The decisions that the dominion cannot regulate particular
trades-for example, the details of the insurance business in the provinces39-
tend to suggest a notion of commerce comparable to the American view that
"interstate commerce" includes only the instrumentalities of interstate trans-
portation and communication and the subject matters moved interstate. 40 This
comparison is further suggested by the invalidation of attempted dominion
regulation of traffic running from dominion to provincial railways,41 of trade
combines,42 of industrial disputes,43 of the grain trade,44 and of laboring and
social conditions;45 while the regulation of aeronautics46 and radio communica-
tion47 by dominion acts has been upheld. It is evident that the power to
regulate trade and commerce is indeed restricted to "general" matters; and that
the usually acknowledged power of the dominion to enact legislation ancillary
38 Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons, 7 App. Cas. 96, 112 (i8i).
39 Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons, 7 App. Cas. 96 (i81); Att'y Gen'l for Canada v.
Att'y Gen'l for Alberta, [i916] 1 A.C. 588, 596; Att'y Gen'l for Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers,
[1924] A.C. 328.
40 The extent of the shift of interpretation which has recently taken place is strikingly illus-
trated by the statement, as late as 1913, by an authority on Canadian constitutional law, that
the commerce power of the United States was not so broad as that of the dominion parliament.
Lefroy, Canada's Federal System 2 3 0 ff. (1913). The same author, in commenting on the
"peace, order, and good government" clause, was led to remark that the lack of a similar
clause was the capital defect of the Constitution of the United States, as illustrated by the
inability of the federal legislature to control such things as the Chicago railway strike of 1894.
Id. at 91-94.
41 City of Montreal v. Montreal St. Ry. Co., [1912] A.C. 333.
42In re Board of Commerce Act 1919, [1922] i A.C. 191. But cf. Proprietary Articles Trade
Ass'n v. Att'y Gen'l for Canada, [i93i] A.C. 310 (criminal statute on combines, hdd, valid),
followed in Att'y Gen'l for British Columbia v. Att'y Gen'l for Canada, 53 T.L.R. 340 (1937).
43 Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396.
44 The King v. Eastern Terminal Elevator Co., [1925] Can. S.C.R. 434 (dominion, hdd,
unable to acquire jurisdiction to deal with local marketing by legislating at same time with
respect to provincial and inter-provincial trade).
4s In re Legislative Jurisdiction over Hours of Labor, [1925] Can. S.C.R. 505.
46 Re Aerial Navigation, [1932] A.C. 54.
47 In re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in Canada, [1932] A.C. 304.
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to the exercise of its enumerated powers45 is very closely confined when it comes
to matters of trade and commerce. From this it is evident that, among all the
conflicting statements of the reasons for the decisions which have created special
limitations on the commerce power, the one feature which is a constant is "free
trade."
CANADIAN NEW DEAL LEGISLATION
To overcome some of the difficulties resulting from excess of "free trade,"
the Canadian government in 1934 initiated a series of acts dealing with nation-
wide economic problems. The dominion government attempted to give effect
to the International Labor Conventions49 by means of acts covering minimum
wages,So limitation of hours of labor," and weekly rest for industrial employees. 2
An unemployment insurance act was also passed.3 The government further
tried to encourage fair competition by means of industrial codes54 enforced
partly by criminal penalties for unfair practices s partly through the use of a
distinctive trade-mark similar in function to the Blue Eagle of the NRA."6 In
addition, agricultural relief was attempted through the rearrangement of farm
creditss1 and through the control of the marketing of natural products." The
48 Where legislation is in effect "necessary and proper" to carry into effect the enumerated
powers, the "ancillary" power to pass such legislation may be found in the residual power of
the dominion. Att'y Gen'l for Ontario v. Att'y Gen'l for the Dominion, [i896] A.C. 348, 359-
6o; Att'y Gen'l for Ontario v. Att'y Gen'l for Canada, [E894], A.C. 187, 200-I.
49 Treaty of Versailles, pt. XIII, arts. 405, 407 (I919), I.L.O. Const., arts. i9, 21 (1919).
so Minimum Wages Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. V., c. 44. See note 61 infra.
s, Limitation of Hours of Work Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. V., c. 63. See note 6i infra.
"2 Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. V., c. 14. See note 61
infra.
53 Employment & Social Insurance Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. V., c. 38. See note 62 infra.
S4 Dominion Trade & Industry Commission Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. V., c. 59, § 14. Held,
invalid as encroachment upon provincial powers over property and civil rights. Att'y Gen'1
for Ontario v. Att'y Gen'l for Canada, 53 T.L.R. 337 (1937).
ss Act to Amend the Criminal Code, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. V., c. 56, § 9. Upheld as proper
criminal legislation, on the ground that the only limitation on the dominion power to enact
criminal statutes is that the statute must not be a mere guise for encroaching upon pro-
vincial powers. Att'y Gen'l for British Columbia v. Att'y Gen'l for Canada, 53 T.L.R. 340
(1937).
"6 Dominion Trade & Industry Commission Act §§ i8, ig. Upheld asproper legislation con-
cerning trade marks and copyrights. Att'y Gen'l for Ontario v. Att'y Gen'l for Canada, 53
T.L.R. 337 (1937). Cf. Att'y Gen'l for New South Wales v. Brewery Employees' Union, 6
C.L.R. 469 (19o8) (union label, held, not a trade mark under Australian constitution).
57 Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. V, c. 53; Farmers' Creditors
Arrangement Act Amendment Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. V, c. 20. Upheld as proper regulation
of bankruptcy and insolvency under § 91 (21). Att'y Gen'l for British Columbia v. Att'y.
Gen'l for Canada 53 T.L.R. 334 (1937).
s"Natural Products Marketing Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. V., C. 57; Natural Products Market-
ing Act Amdt. Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. V., c. 64. See note 6i infra.
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constitutionality of all these acts was questioned. The Privy Council, in passing
on their validity, brought the development of states' rights in Canada to a
climax. By completing the reduction of the residual powers of the dominion,
by still further limiting the scope of the commerce power, and by restricting
the treaty power to the support of the existing domillion powers, the Commit-
tee in effect made the dominion government one of strictly limited, enumerated
powers.
The government sought to sustain its enactments under the "peace, order,
and good government" clause on the ground that the problems treated had
"attained such dimensions as to affect the body politic" and "ceased to be
merely local or personal and to have become matters of national concern."
The Privy Council decided that neither the "abnormal circumstances"9 nor
the "extraordinary peril"'16 necessary to justify such action by the dominion
had been shown. 6' The legislation purported to be permanent and there was
no suggestion of "special emergency." 62 This apparent suggestion that the
permanence of legislation might be an element in determining its validity under
the residual power of the dominion casts some new light on the "emergency"
requirement. It is possible that a problem must not only be pressing but that
some "special" emergency must arise to justify dominion action, which makes
the residual power analogous to a war power 63 and renders it of little practical
importance to the course of national legislation.
The second source of dominion power relied upon in support of the acts was
the trade and commerce power. The relegation of this power to a minor posi-
tion was confirmed by the invalidation of the marketing act, which the govern-
ment had sought to sustain as a regulation of commerce. The inextricable inter-
weaving of local and inter-provincial regulations was held fatal to the entire
act. The result is that the dominion trade and commerce power is limited not
only in that it does not permit federal regulation of local trade and commerce,
but also in that the regulation of mixed inter-provincial and local activity is
beyond the dominion powers. Of course the decision goes on the ground that
the dominion should not be able deliberately to acquire jurisdiction over essen-
tially local matters merely by legislating at the same time about local and
inter-provincial matters. But in the case of marketing, arbitrary geographical
lines are without genuine significance; and regulation, to be practical and fair,
59 In re Board of Commerce Act x919, [1922] 1 A.C. 19r.
60 Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396.
6r Att'y Gen'l for Canada v. Att'y Gen'l for Ontario, 53 T.L.R. 325 (1937).
62Att'y Gen'l for Canada v. Att'y Gen'l for Ontario, 53 T.L.R. 332 (1937) (social in-
surance act held invalid).
63 Cf. Fort Frances Pulp & Paper Co. v. Manitoba Free Press, [1923] A.C. 695 (emergency
war measure). This is the only dominion act which has dealt with provincial matters and
which has been upheld by the Privy Council under the residual power. Cf. Wilson v. New,
243 U.S. 332 (1917) (emergency creates no new powers in the federal government).
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must operate uniformly within any given economic area. In practice both
interstate and intrastate producers and distributors are constantly in competi-
tion; and the regulation of the one but not the other, or even a differential
treatment of competitors, would introduce obvious difficulties. It is therefore
hard to see why the regulation of local marketing was not in this case "neces-
sarily ancillary" to the regulation of inter-provincial marketing relations,
which certainly must be within the trade and commerce power if it has any
meaning at all.64 The "free trade" situation created by the decision invalidating
the dominion act is especially interesting because of the fate of previous at-
tempts at provincial legislation. Produce marketing acts in British Columbia
and Saskatchewan were held invalid for encroaching upon federal powers.s
The result is that neither the dominion nor the provinces can enact effective
marketing acts, aside from the dubious method of federal-state cooperation.
And even cooperation was presented with an additional hurdle by the decision
in the Marketing Act case.66 Here the Privy Council was informed that the
province of British Columbia had set up a local board to handle the local phases
of the marketing program in cooperation with the national board; and it was
urged that since the legislative powers of the dominion and the provinces
together exhaust all possible powers, the act should be held valid as applied to
inter-provincial trade, so as to enable the individual provinces to pass supple-
mental legislation. But it was said that while cooperation was the proper
remedy for the marketing difficulties, such legislation would have to be care-
fully planned so that neither government would leave its own sphere and en-
croach on that of the other.67 This is certainly an important qualification upon
64 The power of the United States government under the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission Act to regulate the rates of intrastate railways competing with interstate lines is
analogous to the dominion's "ancillary" powers.
6s Lawson v. Interior Tree Fruit Committee, [193] S.C.R. 357 (B.C. act idira vires for
affecting marketing beyond the province); Lower Mainland Dairy Products Committee v.
Crystal Dairy, [1933] A.C. i68 (B.C. act Idtra vires as imposing an indirect tax, in conflict
with federal taxing power).
66Att'y Gen'l for British Columbia v. Att'y Gen'l for Canada, 53 T.L.R. 330 (1937).
67 Id. at 332. This view is especially puzzling because the American doctrine of an implied
prohibition against encroachments by one government on the powers of the other, by means of
interference with its instrumentalities (McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316 (18ig)),
has been held to have no application in British constitutional law. Bank of Toronto v. Lambe,
12 App. Cas. 575, 587 (1887). Thus the officers of one government are subject to uniform
taxation levied by the other. Abbott v. City of St. John, 40 Can. S.C.R. 597 (igo8); Caron v.
The King, [1924] A.C. 999; Forbes v. Att'y Gen'l for Manitoba, [1937] A.C. 26o. Corpora-
tions created by the dominion are subject to provincial laws of general application. Citizens
Ins. Co. v. Parsons, 7 App. Cas. 96 (188) (regulation of contracts); Colonial Bldg. and Inv.
Ass'n v. Att'y Gen'l for Quebec, 9 App. Cas. 157 (1884) (mortmain statute); Bank of Toronto
v. Lambe, 12 App. Cas. 575 (1887) (taxation); Brewers & Maltsters Ass'n v. Att'y Gen'l for
Ontario, [1897] A.C. 231 (license tax); Lymburn v. Mayland, [1932] A.C. 318 (securities act).
And conversely, a dominion corporation can use the provincial streets to string wires, etc.,
without permission of the province. Toronto Corp. v. Bell Tel. Co., [i9o5] A.C. 52. The only
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the early notion that no act could possibly be ultra vires both the dominion and
the provinces.68 As a result of these refinements of its meaning, the "trade
and commerce" power of the dominion is not only limited by the specification
of other commercial powers in section 91, but has become more limited than
any of the others.69 Thus, with the residual power of the dominion limited to
emergencies, and the commerce power limited to matters of "general" trade
and commerce and denied the implementation of ancillary legislative power over
local subjects, "free trade" remains unhampered. The provinces alone now
have the constitutional right to deal with any "property and civil rights"
involved in the regulation of trade; and by interpretation the terms "property
and civil rights" have come to include practically all the important aspects of
organized commercial activity.
THE TREATY POWER
A third possible source of dominion power, relied upon in support of the
acts passed to give effect to the international labor conventions, was the treaty
power conferred upon the dominion by section 132 of the constitution.70 But
here it was held that the treaty obligations in question were incurred by the
dominion government itself and were not imposed upon Canada under a treaty
between the British Empire and foreign countries, as required by the express
terms of section 132. There was said to be a difference between the legislative
power of the dominion to perform treaty obligations imposed upon Canada by
the imperial government, and the legislative power of the dominion to perform
obligations imposed upon Canada by the dominion government under its own
treaty-making power.7' No further legislative competence was obtained by
interference which has been barred has been intentional discrimination against agencies of the
other government. Evans v. Hudon, 2 Cart. 346 (1877) (seizure of salary); Leprohon v. City
of Ottawa, i Cart. 592 (tax on salary); John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton, [1915] A.C. 330 (ex-
cluding from recourse to courts); Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co. v. The King, [19i6] 1 A.C.
566; Att'y Gen'l for Ontario v. Att'y Gen'l for Canada, [1916] 1 A.C. 598; Great West Saddlery
Co. v. The King, [1921] 2 A.C. 91 (license fee). See also, Att'y Gen'l for Manitoba v. Att'y
Gen'l for Canada, [1929] A.C. 26o.
68 Att'y Gen'l for Ontario v. Att'y Gen'l for Canada, [1912] A.C. 571, 581.
69 The unusual limitation, in the case of the commerce power upon the generally conceded
"ancillary" powers of the dominion, has already been noted. See p. 626 supra.
70 "The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all Powers necessary or proper
for performing the Obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof, as Part of the British
Empire, toward Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties between the Empire and such
Foreign Countries."
71 The Aeronautics case, [1932] A.C. 54, relied upon by the government, was said to have
been decided upon the express ground that the obligation of the aeronautics convention was
imposed upon Canada before 1931; and that the act sustained in the Radio case, [1932] A.C.
304, covered a subject-matter which was not specified in either § 91 or 92, and hence was within
the residual powers of the dominion. The Privy Council held that the terms of § 132 could not
be strained to meet the event, uncontemplated in 1867, of Canada's having treaty-making
powers.
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the dominion through its accession to national status; it could not merely by
making an agreement with a foreign country to enact legislation obtain a legis-
lative power which it would not otherwise have.72
AUSTRALIA
The decision of the judicial Committee limiting the scope of the treaty power
of the Dominion of Canada completes the development up to the present time
of states' rights and laissez faire in Canada. The decision presents a sharp
contrast to the view taken by the High Court of Australia on the same question
last year. There, in a case holding certain air regulations invalid as inconsistent
with the international aeronautics convention, two of the justices held that the
commonwealth has the power under its external affairs jurisdiction3 to pass
legislation which would be ultra vires if tested by the commonwealth's specific
constitutional powers.7 4 This instance of the contrary treatment of the same
constitutional question by the Privy Council and the High Court is by no means
unique. For this reason a comparison of the decisions of the High Court with
the decisions of the Privy Council on similar constitutional issues throws the
laissez-faire policy of the Privy Council into sharp relief.
In reversing a High Court decision involving the freedom of interstate trade
last year, the Privy Council illustrated the manner in which ambiguous pro-
visions have become constitutional guarantees of laissez faire. Privy Council
decisions on questions of Australian federal-state relations are rare because of
a constitutional provision which limits appeals except on certificate from the
High Court.75 Nevertheless the High Court did grant a certificate to appeal
72Att'y Gen'l for Canada v. Att'y Gen'l for Ontario, 53 T.L.R. 325, 330 (i937). For a dis-
cussion of the present status of the Canadian treaty power and a comparison with that of the
United States, see Rice, Can Canada Ratify International Labor Conventions?, 12 Wis. L.
Rev. 185 (1937).
73 "The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the
peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to: .... (xxix) Ex-
ternal affairs." Com. Aust. Const. Act, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 12, § SI (xxix) (1900).
74 New York Times, Nov. IS, 1936, § 4, P. 5, col. I. Cf. Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22
Geo. V, c. 4, § 9 (1): "Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to authorise the Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia to make laws on any matter within the authority of the States of
Australia, not being a matter within the authority of the Parliament or Government of the
Commonwealth of Australia."
7s "No appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in Council from a decision of the High Court
upon any question, howsoever arising, as to the limits inter se of the Constitutional powers
of the Commonwealth and those of any State or States, or as to the limits inter se of the Con-
stitutional powers of any two or more States, unless the High Court shall certify that the
question is one which ought to be determined by Her Majesty in Council.
"The High Court may so certify if satisfied that for any special reason the certificate should
be granted, and thereupon an appeal shall lie to Her Majesty in Council on the question with-
out further leave.
"Except as provided in this section, this Constitution shall not impair any right which the
Queen may be pleased to exercise by virtue of Her Royal prerogative to grant special leave of
appeal from the High Court to Her Majesty in Council. The Parliament may make laws
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from its decision in James v. Commonwealth,76 a case involving the construction
of section 92 of the constitution act, which provides that from the time of the
federal government's taking over the collection of customs duties interstate
trade "shall be absolutely free."' 77 The High Court had held that section 92 did
not purport to bind the commonwealth, but that its purpose was to prevent the
states from isolating themselves by means of impediments to interstate trade
as such. Accordingly the court had upheld a federal marketing act restricting
the proportion of the total crop which a producer could sell in interstate markets
and requiring the remainder to be exported.78 On appeal the Privy Council
reversed, on the grounds (a) that section 92 bound the commonwealth as well
as the states and (b) that the Dried Fruits Act fell within the prohibition of
the section.79
An examination of these contrary decisions of the High Court and the Privy
Council, in the light of the body of interpretations of section 92 built up by the
Australian court, indicates that either decision is compatible with the demo-
cratic policy of protecting the security of person and possessions, or with the
notion of a federal system as distinct from unitary or authoritarian states. The
difference lies in that the one decision leaves the determination of national
economic policy to the federal legislature; the other tends to leave no alternative
to laissezfaire. The James case involved not only the question of what govern-
ments were bound by section 92, but also what types of burdens on commerce
were prohibited. However, assuming the correctness of the Privy Council's
decision that the commonwealth was bound,8 ° the principal point is the scope
of the "freedom" of trade required to be preserved.
Under the decisions of the High Court the prohibition of section 92 has not
been limited merely to differential treatment of interstate and intrastate trade
by the states, but extends to all measures whereby the states attempt to isolate
limiting the matters in which such leave may be asked, but proposed laws containing any such
limitation shall be reserved by the Governor-General for Her Majesty's pleasure." Corn. Aust.
Const. Act § 74 (igoo).
16 52 C.L.R. 570 (1935).
77 "On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and intercourse
among the States, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be abso-
lutely free.
"But notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, goods imported before the imposition
of uniform duties of customs into any State .... , shall on thence passing into another State
within two years after the imposition of such duties, be liable to any duty chargeable on the
importation of such goods into the Commonwealth, less any duty paid in respect of the goods
on their importation." Com. Aust. Const. Act § 92 (i9oo).
78 Dried Fruits Act, 1928-35 (no. II of i928; no. 5 of 1935).
79 James v. Commonwealth, [1936] A.C. 578.
So Examination of the treatment of this question by the High Court reveals the difficulty
of choosing between constructions. See W. & A. McArthur v. Queensland, 28 C.L.R. 530, 556
(1920); James v. Commonwealth, 52 C.L.R. 570 (1935); Cf. ibid., [1936] A.C. 578, 6o9 ff.
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themselves from other states in matters of trade. Thus it has been held that a
state cannot directly discriminate against commodities coming in from outside
the state.s' Although a quarantine law to prevent importation of stock from
suspected areas was once upheld,8 2 this decision was criticized in a later case
holding a similar act invalid.8 3 A tax on vendors of motor fuel has been held
invalid;s4 and a motor fuel dealers' licensing act which required licensees to
purchase a certain proportion of locally manufactured fuel alcohol has been
invalidated because in its practical operation it could apply only to importers.85
In dealing with the attempts by states to control marketing, the court has dis-
allowed plans whereby the export of a commodity from the state was pro-
hibited,8 6 or the proportion to be marketed interstate was limited, 7 or whereby
state ownership of commodities was undertaken in order to restrict exports, 88
on the ground that they were burdensome. A plan whereby a state set an upper
bound to the prices at which commodities could be sold in the state has been
held invalid as to commodities coming in from other states;89 but a plan to
control marketing in metropolitan areas, whereby all milk intended for sale in
the area became the property of a board, which set a minimum price to pro-
81 Fox v. Robbins, 8 C.L.R. 115 (zooS).
S2Ex parte Nelson [no. i], 42 C.L.R. 209 (1928) (Stock Act igoi (N.S.W.)); cf. Roughley
v. New South Wales, 42 C.L.R. 162 (1928).
83 Tasmania v. Victoria, 52 C.L.R. 57 (1935) (Vegetable & Vine Diseases Act 1928 (Vict.).
Ex parte Nelson was a 3-3 decision. The existence of an apparently adequate commonwealth
quarantine act may have led the High Court to suspect these acts of regulatory purposes.
84 Commonwealth Oil Refineries v. South Australia, 34 C.L.R. 408 (1926).
8
s Vacuum Oil Proprietary v. Queensland, 5i C.L.R. 1o8 (1934). It should be noted that
no petroleum products were being produced in Queensland, and that the licensing act exempted
purchasers mediately or immediately from a licensee; so tht the the effect was to aid local
manufacturers by restricting imports of gasoline.
86 Meat Supply for Imperial Uses Act igi5 (N.S.W.) § 5(1), authorizing state to prevent
export of stock. Foggitt, Jones & Co. v. New South Wales, 21 C.L.R. 357 (gi6).
87 Dried Fruits Act 1924-25 (S.A.) (provisions limiting amount of fruit which could be
marketed in the commonwealth). James v. South Australia, 40 C.L.R. i (1927); cf. Pennsyl-
vania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (state law limiting shipment of natural gas out of
state held invalid).
8 8 Primary Producers' Org. & Mkting Act 1926-3o (Q.), providing for government's taking
over marketing of products and distributing proceeds to producers. Peanut Board v. Rock-
hampton Harbour Board, 48 C.L.R. 266 (1933), following James v. Cowan, [1932] A.C. 542.
See note 9i infra. Cf. Geer v. Connecticut, i61 U.S. 519 (1896) (held, not a burden on com-
merce for state to restrict sale and transportation of game, where state is owner of local game).
89 Profiteering Prevention Act 1920 (Q.). W. & A. McArthur v. Queensland, 28 C.L.R.
530 (1920) (overruling Duncan v. Queensland, 22 C.L.R. 556 (i916)), which had been de-
cided on analogy to the Wheat case, 20 C.L.R. 54 (1915). See note 9z infra. This case pre-
sents the closest Australian equivalent to the "original package doctrine." But cf. note go
infra.
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ducers, has been approved.9° Finally, marketing plans by which a state as-
sumed ownership of commodities, abrogated all existing contracts of sale, and
empowered a board to sell and account for the proceeds to the producers, have
been considered proper.9 ' These plans for the regulation of marketing have
been regarded in the same light as any other state legislation involving some
degree of interference with interstate commercial activities. The "freedom"
of commerce under section 92 has been said by the High Court to mean freedom
from any sort of impediment or control by a state with respect to interstate
trade considered "as interstate trade."92 It does not mean freedom from charges
for or restrictions upon the privilege of using the state's facilities for commer-
cial purposes.93
In all these cases the High Court has held to the position that as long as
state legislation does not have the purpose or the effect of isolating the state,
the state can impose the same type of restrictions on the activities of people
who market goods as it can upon people who engage in any other kind of ac-
tivity: that is, the state may subject them to "police regulation," a regulation
that in Australia is not hampered by anything in the nature of a "due process"
clause. Thus, even assuming that section 92 binds the commonwealth equally
with the states, the High Court, consistently with its prior interpretation of
the kind of "freedom" which is guaranteed, could have sustained a marketing
act similar to that involved in James v. Commonwealth. The interstate com-
merce power of the federal government is a power of police over nationwide
90 Milk Act 1931 (N.S.W.). Crothers v. Sheil, 49 C.L.R. 399 (I933) (decided on ground
that the act operated only after the possibility of further interstate transportation had ceased.
Lack of any tax feature held to distinguish the Crystal Dairy case, ['933] A.C. i68, note 65
s$pra.
9' Wheat Acquisition Act 1914 (N.S.W.): New South Wales v. Commonwealth, 20 C.L.R.
54 (i'zS). Dried Fruits Act 1924-27 (S.A.) § 20, providing for acquisition of all Australian-
grown dried fruit in the state: James v. Cowan, 43 C.L.R. 386 (930) (reversed by Privy Coun-
cil, [1932] A.C. 542). The only restriction imposed by § 92 on a state's general power to take
away the attributes of ownership is that the state cannot use expropriation purely for the pur-
pose of depriving a person of the right to use goods in interstate trade. Duncan v. Queens-
land, 22 C.L.R. 556,o2 (z916); Foggitt, Jones & Co. v. New South Wales, 21 C.L.R. 357, 361
(z916).
"New South Wales v. Commonwealth, 20 C.L.R. 54, 66 (i9S).
93 For example, a state may require registration or licensing of users of its highways, in-
cluding parties on interstate journeys and carriers doing purely interstate business. Bessell v.
Dayman, 52 C.L.R. 215 (I935) (private party); Willard v. Rawson, 48 C.L.R. 316 (i933)
(registration of truck); Ex parte Hill, 5o C.L.R. 30 (1933) (license fee on truck), citing Inter-
state Transit v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 186 (1931); Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 171
(1928). A state may exact a special charge upon interstate truckers, measured by the ton-mile
(0. Gilpin, Ltd. v. Comissioner, 52 C.L.R. 189 (1935) ); and may refuse to license truckers
who would compete with state railways, or exact a special charge measured by the length of
the competing route. Duncan & Green Star Trading Co. v. Vizzard, 53 C.L.R. 493 (1935).
Cf. Bradley v. P.U. Comm., 289 U.S. 92, 97 (1933).
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commerce similar to the power of a state over commerce within the state. Under
the High Court's interpretation, the prohibition of section 92 was imposed to
prevent the erection of barriers to trade among the states. A regulation of
commerce by the federal government might prevent the passage of goods from
state to state to isolate the states, or might prevent passage merely as an inci-
dent of the enforcement of some policing regulation imposed upon the activities
of people engaged in nationwide commerce.
The contrast of the High Court's interpretation with that made by the
Privy Council in James v. Cowan94 and James v. Commonwealthgs is immediately
apparent. The result of the two decisions indicates clearly that the real issue
in the cases was not the limits inter se of the powers of the federal and state
governments; for the decision in James v. Commonwealth did not prevent the
federal government from taking over a function properly belonging to the
states, but from taking over a function which had been specifically denied to
the states in James v. Cowan. Because there is no "states' rights" issue involved,
the question is simply one of construction of an ambiguous constitutional pro-
vision. The Privy Council construction is based on a notion of freedom of
trade the effect of which is to withdraw the power of any government-federal
or state or both acting together-to deal effectively with the control of national
markets.
TM MDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION cLAUSE
In spite of this reversal with respect to marketing control, however, the
development in Australia of methods for controlling other national economic
problems has been considerably aided by the refusal of the High Court to inter-
fere in matters of legislative policy. Perhaps the most illuminating develop-
ment, from the standpoint of this discussion, is that of the federal power to
provide for conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes, conferred by
section 51(xxxv) of the constitution:
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the
peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to: ....
(xxxv) Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial
disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State.
This provision, although much more limited in its terms than the "trade and
commerce" clause of the Canadian constitution, has in fact been developed into
a provision for the control of all the aspects of the employer-employee relation
which have any bearing on industrial peace and which are not dearly within
the range of the actual capacities of the states. The "no-man's land," where the
state has exclusive power but not the capacity to deal with important problems,
is singularly absent. Yet in the beginning of its constitutional development, the
powers of the Australian Commonwealth were far more restricted than were
those of the Dominion of Canada under the earlier interpretation of the British
North America Act.
94 [1932] A.C. 542. See p. 635 and note 91 szupra.
95 [1936] A.C. 578. See p. 633, and notes 79, 8o supra.
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The relations of the federal and state governments in Australia are presum-
ably governed by section io9 of the constitution, which provides for supremacy
of the federal government in respect to the powers expressly conferred upon it
by the constitution.96 From igoo until the decision of the Engineers' case in
192o, however, the general tendency of the High Court was to impose restric-
tions upon the paramount authority of the federal government. Thus it was
held that the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, acting within its jurisdic-
tion over industrial disputes extending beyond any one state, could not make
an award inconsistent with a state minimum wage law as determined by a state
wages board. 9" This decision introduced the familiar difficulties of differential
treatment of wage matters by different states. However, under the changed
interpretation of the constitution introduced in 192o, the earlier decision was
avoided on a more restricted notion of "inconsistency," first in a case where
the federal court fixed a minimum wage lower,98 then in a case where it fixed
a wage higher than the state law required.99 Finally the earlier case was over-
ruled, and it was held that a federal award would override any state law whose
effect if enforced would be to alter or destroy the adjustment made by the
award; and that the test of inconsistency was not merely the ability of the em-
ployer to obey both requirements.1°° But on the other hand, under the changed
interpretation the state industrial authorities were still protected in their juris-
diction over matters capable of being handled locally. Practically, the changed
interpretation involved little change in the effective jurisdiction of the states.
The jurisdiction of the federal arbitration court still extended only to disputes
which could in some sense be said to be interstate in character;oI and further,
the federal court's jurisdiction continued to extend only to matters within
96"When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall
prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid." Com. Aust.
Const. Act § io9 (igoo).
97Australian Boot Trade Employees' Ass'n v. Whybrow, io C.L.R. 266 (191o).
98 Federated Engine-Drivers' & Firemen's Ass'n v. Adelaide Chem. & F. Co., 28 C.L.R. i
(1920).
99 John Heine & Son v. Pickard, 29 C.L.R. 592 (1921).
loo Clyde Engineering Co. v. Cowburn, 37 C.L.R. 466 (1926). Thus a state minimum wage
higher than that set by the arbitration court's award is invalid. H. V. McKay Proprietary
v. Hunt, 38 C.L.R. 305 (1926). Cf. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. (U.S.) 299 (1857).
lo' It was held in an early case that an employer doing business in two or more states was
subject to the jurisdiction of the arbitration court. Ex parte Broken Hill Proprietary, 8 C.L.R.
419 (i9o9). An interstate dispute has been said to be one which at a given moment exists in
two or more states. The Builders' Labourers' Case, x8 C.L.R. 224 (1914). A dispute was held
to be within federal jurisdiction where the work done was performed outside Australia but the
men resided in Australia (Merchant Service Guild v. Commonwealth S.S. Owners' Ass'n, 16
C.L.R. 664 (913)). But a dispute over a reduction of wages in one state did not become inter-
state when workers in other states struck because they feared wage reductions. Caledonian
Collieries v. Australasian Coal & Shale Employees Federation [no. I], 42 C.L.R. 527 (,930).
Nor did a union create an interstate dispute by means of a formal demand on employers in
other states in the course of a dispute in one state. Ibid. [no. 2], 42 C.L.R. 558 (1930).
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the ambit of the dispute being settled. Thus where a state branch of a union
resigned and withdrew from proceedings, the federal court could not prevent
the state authority from taking jurisdiction. X 2 The federal court can restrain
a state board only insofar as it is trying to deal with a matter which is before
the federal court;0 3 and it has been held that a state industrial commission is
not "dealing" with a dispute when it is merely inquiring into conditions with a
view to laying down a general rule irrespective of any dispute.°4
These later decisions on the limits of the federal and state industrial authori-
ties represent merely the application to matters of employer-employee relation-
ships of the general doctrine that under section 1o9 the federal government's
power is paramount. 05 This is a somewhat surprising development, however,
in view of the controversial character of policies pertaining to labor relations
and the regulation of industrial activity. The manner in which the dominion
government in Canada has been restricted in its attempts to control similar
matters has already been noted.
In order to appreciate the extent of this development in Australia, however,
it is necessary to go back and trace the alterations which have been made in
the character of federal-state relationships from the time the constitution was
adopted in i9oo.
The doctrinal differences centered upon the adoption by the High Court of
American precedents, including especially the notion of implied prohibitions
upon one government's interference with the agencies and instrumentalities of
the other. The case of McCulloch v. Marylandlo6 was adopted as an authority
in D'Emden v. Pedder,"7 one of the first cases decided under the new constitu-
tion."°5 The court there said:
when a state attempts to give its legislative or executive authority an operation which,
if valid, would fetter, control, or interfere with, the free exercise of the legislative or
executive power of the Commonwealth, the attempt, unless expressly authorized by
the Constitution, is to that extent invalid and inoperative?og
Accordingly attempts to subject federal officers to uniform taxation were re-
sisted by the High Court, the court relying upon Dobbins v. Commissioners of
- West Australian Timber Workers' Indust. Union v. W. Aust. Sawmillers' Ass'n, 43
C.L.R. 185 (1929).
"03 Australian Timber Workers' Union v. Sydney & S.T.M. Ass'n. 53 C.L.R. 665 (I935).
104 Ex pare Engineers Conciliation Commission, 38 C.L.R. 563 (1927).
'os Cf. Hume v. Palmer, 38 C.L.R. 441 (1926) (state navigation act inconsistent with federal
act is invalid, no matter which was passed first); Ex parne McLean, 43 C.L.R. 472 (1930) (where
same conduct was punishable differently under federal and state acts, ld, state act invalid
to extent of the difference).
1o64 Wheat. (U.S.) 316 (i8ig).
1o 1 C.L.R. 91 (1904) (federal officers and instrumentalities of the federal government,
hdd, immune from state taxation).
log See Higgins, McCullock v. Maryland in Australia, 18 Harv. L. Rev. 559 (I9o5).
109 1 C.L.R. 91, III (19o4).
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Erie County,'"' and refusing to follow Bank of Toronto v. Lambe" on the ground
that the Australian constitution had been deliberately patterned after that of
the United States, whereas in the Canadian constitution the pattern was
avoided. The result was a set of conflicting decisions by the High Court and
the Privy Council'- which were resolved only by an Australian act which in
effect prevented appeals to the Privy Council on federal-state questions."3
Following the decision in D'Emden v. Pedder, the High Court adopted the
converse doctrine of The Collector v. Day"4 in holding a state-operated railway
immune to interference by the arbitration court of the federal government." 5
The uniform taxation of state imports for the use of state agencies was per-
mitted, however;, 6 and the immunity of state and federal agencies was held
not to extend to agencies performing "non-governmental" functions,"7 although
the court curiously distinguished governmental from non-governmental func-
tions on the basis of what functions the states had been performing in r9oo."8
110 16 Pet. (U.S.) 435 (1842)
'"2 App. Cas. 575 (1887). The rule in D'Emden v. Pedder was applied in Deakin v.
Webb, i C.L.R. 585 (1904), which overruled the decision of the Victoria court in Wollaston's
Case, 28 V.L.R. 357 (19o2) (federal officer held taxable).
- A difficulty arose in x907 when an appeal was taken direct to the Privy Council from a
state supreme court in a taxation case. The Privy Council took a position opposed to that of
the High Court. Webb v. Outtrim, [1907] A.C. 8r. (Cf. Abbott v. City of St. John, 40
Can. S.C.R. 597 (93o8)). The High Court, however, refused to follow the Privy Council's
decision. Flint v. Webb, 4 C.L.R. 1178 (1907); Baxter v. Com'rs of Taxation (N.S.W.), 4
C.L.R. io87 (1907).
113 Federal Act No. 8, 1907, providing that cases involving a federal-state question were
ipsofacto removable to the High Court. Sec. 74 of the constitution prohibits appeals on such
questions from federal courts without permission of the High Court. The act was upheld.
Jones v. Commonwealth Court of Concil. & Arb., [I917] A.C. 528; Minister for Trading Con-
cern for W.A. v. Amalg. Soc. of Engrs., [1923] A.C. 170. See also Commonwealth v. Limerick
S.S. Co., 35 C.L.R. 69 (1924) (state court exercising federal jurisdiction cannot grant leave to
appeal to the Privy Council).
A statute making the salaries of federal officers taxable was upheld. Chaplin v. Com'r of
Taxes (S.A.), 12 C.L.R. 375 (1911).
14 Ii Wall. (U.S.) 113 (1870).
I's Federated Amalg. Gov't Ry. & Tramway Service Ass'n v. N.S.W. Ry. Traffic Employees'
Ass'n (The Railway Servants' Case), 4 C.L.R. 488 (x9o6).
xz6The King v. Sutton (The Wire Netting Case), 5 C.L.R. 789 (19o8); Att'y. Gen'l. for
New South Wales v. Collector of Customs (N.S.W.) (The Steel Rails Case), S C.L.R. 818
(i9o8). Cf. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (I9io).
"7 State: Jumbunna Coal Mine v. Victorian Coal Miners' Ass'n, 6 C.L.R. 309 (19o8)
(mining); Federated Engine-Drivers' & Firemen's Ass'n v. Broken Hill Proprietary [no. i],
12 C.L.R. 398, 426, 442 (1911) (electricity); ibid. [no. 2], 16 C.L.R. 245 (i913); Australian
Workers' Union v. Adelaide Milling Co., 26 C.L.R. 46o (i919) (wheat handling under market-
ingact).
Federal: Heiner v. Scott, 19 C.L.R. 38i (i914) (state tax on checks drawn on federal bank,
relations of bank to customers not being governmental), citing Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat.
(U.S.) 738 (1824), R.R. Co. v. Peniston, 85 U.S. 5, 36 (1873).
118 Railway Servants' Case, 4 C.L.R. 488, 538-39 (I908).
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In I920, following several changes in the personnel of the High Court, the
involved distinctions and contradictions of the "implied prohibitions" doctrine
were cleared away by the decision in the Engineers' case." 9 This case involved
the immunity of a steamship line operated by one of the states of Australia from
the jurisdiction of the federal arbitration court. In holding the steamship line
subject to an award of the arbitration court, the High Court reaffirmed the rule
of D'Emden v. Pedder,*o but only on the ground of the federal supremacy con-
ferred by section IO9 of the constitution. The doctrine of implied prohibitions
was repudiated as applied to state immunity from interference by the federal
government acting within the scope of its own powers."' It was held that the
proper rules for construction of the constitution were those laid down by the
Privy Council;' and that if by those rules a power was found to be conferred
on the commonwealth, no implied prohibition against the exercise of the power
could arise. It was held further that the proper distinction between "strictly
governmental" and non-governmental functions must be made in terms of the
things without which a government cannot exist or function.13 After this
decision, special immunities of state and federal agencies or officers were no
longer a bar to the uniform operation of laws which were themselves intra
Vires.124
Up to this point the judicial history of Australia has divided itself into two
fairly distinct periods, the differences in the treatment of federal-state relations
being occasioned by differences in the individual views of the judges of the
High Court on what was the proper manner of reading the constitution. But
there is another development which is equally interesting in its bearing on the
present attempts to revise the constitution of the United States. Over the whole
period from 19oo to the present, the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration,
aided by occasional amendments to the Conciliation and Arbitration Act of
19o4, has been developing machinery for the attainment of many economic
"19 Amalg. Soc. of Engineers v. Adelaide S.S. Co., 28 C.L.R. 129 (1920).
120 i C.L.R. 9I, 111 (i9o4).
2 The court entertained the argument that McCulloch v. Maryland stood only for the
supremacy of the federal government when acting within the scope of its express powers.
Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 596, 603 (i9i8). The court overruled The Railway
Servants' Case, Deakin v. Webb, and Baxter v. Com'rs of Taxation.
- Webb v. Outtrim, [r9o7] A.C. 81; Att'y Gen'l for Australia v. Colonial Sugar Refining
Co., [1914] A.C. 237.
-3 See Coomber v. justices of Berks, 9 App. Cas. 61 (1883); cf. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
220 U.S. 107 (i9io); Vilas v. Manila, 220 U.S. 345 (1911).
124 Merchant Service Guild v. Commonwealth S.S. Owners' Ass'n [no. 2], 28 C.L.R. 436
(1920) (state harbor commissioners subject to arbitration court); Australian Railways Union
v. Victorian Railways Comr, 44 C.L.R. 319 (1930) (state railway commissioners); Pirrie v.
McFarlane, 36 C.L.R. 170 (1925) (member of Royal Air Force, driving car under order of
superior officer, held, guilty of violating state driver's license law. Cf. Johnson v. Maryand,
254 U.S. 51 (1920) (postoffice employee held exempt from driver's license law)).
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adjustments which have been the objects of unsuccessful attempts at legislation
in the United States and Canada.
The practical operation of the plan adopted by the Australian parliament to
give effect to section 5T (x-xxv) of the constitution is committed largely to an
administrative tribunal, the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. The gen-
eral plan of the present arbitration act is to provide for registration of national
organizations of employers and employees in given industries or trades. Such
organizations can voluntarily bargain with one another, or with other interested
parties, for the purpose of settling difficulties. Any agreement reached may be
registered with the arbitration court and thereupon have the same effect as an
award made by the court. 25 If an organization disagrees with parties in two or
more states, it may file a "plaint" with the court, naming all interested parties
and asking an award in accordance with certain conditions set forth in a "log."
The adverse parties may also file logs setting forth rival plans. The court
thereupon will examine evidence and make an investigation.
The function of the court is to determine in the first instance whether the
grievances of the parties constitute an actual or probable "dispute," and
whether such a dispute "extends beyond any one state." If these facts are
found, the court may proceed to make any award which it considers proper
to effect a settlement, 6 subject only to a determination of its reasonableness
by the High Court. Once an award has been made, the arbitration act provides
suitable remedies for its enforcement, including, if necessary, an order "in the
nature of injunction or mandamus" from the High Court.1"7
125 It was once held that an agreement made by an association before it was entitled to
register as a national organization became binding upon the passage of a statute entitling the
union to register (J. C. Williamson v. Musicians' Union, iS C.L.R. 636 (I912) ); but this deci-
sion was later overruled. Australian Agricultural Co. v. Federated Engine-Drivers' &c. Ass'n,
17 C.L.R. 261 (I913).
-6 The chief requirement is that the matter settled must havebeen within the class of matters
in dispute. The arbitration court can re-examine previous agreements. Federated Engine-
Drivers' & Firemen's Ass'n v. Broken Hill Proprietary [no. 3], i6 C.L.R. 715 (1913). Upon
application for reconsideration, the court may lower the minimum wage below its previous
figure (Federated Engine-Drivers' and Firemen's Ass'n v. Ai Amalgamated, 35 C.L.R. 349
(1924) ); but it may not set a figure outside the range determined by the demands of the parties.
Australian Ins. Staffs' Federation v. Atlas Ins. Co., 45 C.L.R. 409 (1931). However, where
the employer's log does not promise a definite sum, the award may be lower than any amount
specified. Federated Millers &c. Ass'n v. Butcher, 47 C.L.R. 246 (1932) ("adjustment clause"
in employer's log); Australian Workers' Union v. Graziers' Ass'n, 47 C.L.R. 22 (1932) (offer to
pay so much "or as much lower as may seem just"). The court may, if necessary, adopt a
plan different from that of either party. Australian Tramway Employees Ass'n v. Com'r for
Road Transp. & T., 53 C.L.R. 90 (935). But the court may not impose a closed shop require-
ment in the absence of unusual circumstances. Anthony Hordem & Sons v. Amalg. Clothing
&c. Union, 47 C.L.R. 1 (1932).
127 Whittaker Bros. v. Aust. Timb. Workers' Union, 31 C.L.R. 564 (1922). Once an award
has been made, to run for a definite period, its terms cannot be changed. Federated Gas
Employees' Indust. Union v. Metropolitan Gas Co., 27 C.L.R. 72 (i919). The compulsory
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The possibility of abuse of its function by the arbitration court is minimized
by the power of the High Court to issue writs of prohibition, if necessary, to
stop proceedings in respect to matters over which the arbitration court lacks
jurisdiction. 21 Any party to a dispute may apply at any time, before or after
an award,"29 for a determination of the question of jurisdiction-whether a dis-
pute exists or is probable, is an "industrial" dispute, and extends beyond the
limits of any one state-or for a determination of any question of law arising in
the proceeding.130
In practice, there has been a tendency to expand the jurisdiction of the
arbitration court, by means of broadening definitions of a "dispute,"''1 of an
character of the arbitration provided by the arbitration act was held not to impair its validity.
Ex pare Whybrow, ii C.L.R. i (igio). Cf. Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court of Kansas,
262 U.S. 522 (1923). Strikes and lockouts by parties subject to the jurisdiction of the arbitra-
tion court may be enjoined. Stemp v. Australian Glass Mfg. Co., 23 C.L.R. 226 (1917). Re-
fusal of union members to accept employment because employer would not employ specified
members constitutes a strike. Australian Commonwealth Shipping Ed. v. Federated Sea-
men's Union, 35 C.L.R. 462 (1925). Cf. Anderson v. Shipowners' Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359 (1926)
(system of designating specific men for a given job held restraint of trade). Third parties may
be enjoined or prosecuted for inciting strikes. Graziers' Ass'n v. Labor Daily, 44 C.L.R.i
(1930) (newspaper); Waddel v. Australian Workers' Union, 3o C.L.R. 570 (1922) (inciting
union member to refuse employment); Walsh v. Sainsbury, 36 C.L.R. 464 (1925) (union officer
inciting member to refuse work). Third parties may commence prosecution of an employer
for a discriminatory discharge. Pearce v. W. D. Peacock & Co., 23 C.L.R. 199 (1917).
12s Ex parte Whybrow, i i C.L.R. I (I91o). A statute depriving the High Court of the power
to issue prohibition was held vtra vires. The Tramways Case [no. i], i8 C.L.R. 54 (914). It
was held also that the High Court could issue prohibition after an award had been made.
The Builders' Labourers' Case, i8 C.L.R. 224 (1914).
-9 Ince Bros. v. Federated Clothing & Allied Trades Union, 34 C.L.R. 457 (1924).
13o This review is provided by § 2IAA of the arbitration act. The High Court may not
issue prohibition where the ground on which it is asked could be used defensively in the arbi-
tration court (Ex park Australian Agricultural Co., 22 C.L.R. 261 (i96) ); but an applica-
tion under § 2IAA may be made. Ex pare Motions and Prohibitions, 21 C.L.R. 669 (1916).
However, the power of the High Court to issue prohibition was not destroyed by the passage of
§ 2IAA. Waterside Workers' Federation v. Gilchrist, Watt & Sanderson, 34 C.L.R. 482 (1924).
13, Although absence of preconcert among employers in different states was originally held
not conclusive, it was held evidence of the non-existence of a real dispute. Federated Sawmill
&c Employees' Ass'n v. James Moore & Son, 8 C.L.R. 465 (i9o9). Later decisions defined the
nature of a "dispute." Rex v. Comm. Ct. of Concil. and Arbitration, and Merchant Service
Guild, 15 C.L.R. 586 (1912) (must have some element of persistence likely to endanger in-
dustrial peace); Merchant Service Guild v. Newcastle & Hunter River S.S. Co. [no. i], 16
C.L.R. 705 (1913) (dispute may be only "probable"); ibid. [no. 2], i6 C.L.R. 705 (1913)
(previous dissatisfaction known to employer not necessary), but Cf. Caledonian Collieries v.
Australasian Coal & Shale Employees' Federation [no. 2], 42 C.L.R. 558 (930) (stopping
work without demand not a dispute); The Tramways Case [no. 2], ig C.L.R. 43 (1914) (de-
mand made for purpose of coming within jurisdiction of arbitration court not a dispute).
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"interstate dispute, '' 32 and of an "industrial dispute"; " 3 and by means of an
increasingly comprehensive notion of the number of parties who are directly
concerned in achieving a settlement134 Although at an early date the High
Court disallowed a statute which would have permitted the arbitration court
to declare a common rule in any given industry,135 the latitude of the powers
of the court has become such that if necessary the court can make an award
which is binding on all the employers in a given industry, whether they employ
any union members or not, 36 and on all the employees in a given industry,
whether they are union members or not. 37 A party to an award may be bound
in respect of some subject-matter-e.g., employment of minors-in relation to
all other persons, whether or not such persons were themselves parties to the
award.X3s
The High Court has by its present interpretation of the constitution achieved
an adjustment between federal and state governments, the result of which is
to give the governments of Australia the power to govern economic conflicts
132 See note ioi supra.
133 Amalg. Soc. of Engineers v. Australasian Inst. of Marine Engineers, 9 C.L.R. 48 (19og)
(marine engineers are part of shipping industry); Federated Engine-Drivers' & Firemen's
Ass'n v. Broken Hill Proprietary [no. I], i2 C.L.R. 398 (1911) (steam engine operators not a
subsection of a definite industry), but cf. ibid. [no. 2], x6 C.L.R. 245 (1913) (arbitration act
amendment of i911 permitted engineers' union to register); Australian Ins. Staff's Fed. v.
Accident Underwriters' Ass'n, 33 C.L.R. 517 (1924) (banking and insurance employees held
"industrial"); Australian Workers' Union v. Pastoralists' Federal Council, 23 C.L.R. 22
(1917) (agriculture); J. C. Williamson v. Musicians' Union, 15 C.L.R. 636 (1912) (musicians);
Federated State School Teachers' Ass'n v. Victoria, 4x C.L.R. 569 (X929) (school teachers held
not industrial employees); Merchant Service Guild v. Commonwealth S.S. Owners' Ass'n
[no. 2], 28 C.L.R. 436 (1920) (operations need not be carried on for profit to be industrial).
134 Ex parke William Holyman & Sons, 18 C.L.R. 273 (i914) (award held not binding on
employees who claimed they had no dispute with employer); Australian Workers' Union v.
Pastoralists' Federal Council, 23 C.L.R. 22 (1917) (held not necessary to show employees in
dispute with employer; dispute between employer and union); Australian Timb. Workers'
Union v. John Sharp & Sons, 26 C.L.R. 302 (i919) (union may have dispute with employer
who employs no union members); Burwood Cinema v. Australian Theatrical & Amus. Em-
ployees' Ass'n, 35 C.L.R. 528 (1925) (demand by union on employers, some not employing
members of union, held dispute involving all employers. Ex park William Holyman & Sons
overruled in part); In re Metropolitan Gas Co., 4x C.L.R. 402 (1928) (second union got a more
favorable award than the first; held only members of second union entitled to benefit); In re
American Dry Cleaning Co., 43 C.L.R. 29 (1929) (award purporting to bind employer as to all
employees held applicable only to union employees); Amalg. Engineering Union v. Metal
Trades Employers' Ass'n, 53 C.L.R. 658 (1935) (award held binding on all members of
employers' association, present and future, as to all union members employed by them).
'35 Australian Boot Trade Employees' Federation v. Whybrow, ii C.L.R. 311 (i9o).
136 Metal Trades Employers' Ass'n v. Amalg. Engineering Union, 54 C.L.R. 387 (1935). In
this case the court overruled In re Metropolitan Gas Co., 41 C.L.R. 4o2 (1928), note 134 supra.
137 Australian Timb. Workers' Union v. Stewarts, Ltd., 55 C.L.R. 72 (r936).
138 Long v. Chubbs Australian Co., 53 C.L.R. 143 (1935).
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and to leave the determinations of policy involved in the use of the power to
the legislative branches. This development presents a marked contrast to the
laissez faire policy which has accompanied the constitutional interpretation
adopted in all three countries insofar as it has been controlled-directly or in-
directly-by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council.
LAISSEZ FAIRE AND FREE TRADE
The adoption of laissezfaire as an essential element of governmental policy
is subject to criticism for at least two reasons. In the first place, the kind of
economic freedom which has resulted from the judicial prohibition of govern-
ment "interference" with trade lacks the features which have been urged in
defense of laissez faire as an economic doctrine. The economic doctrine of
laissezfaire assumes unrestricted trade and a market made by free competition
among approximately equal bargaining agents. The objection which the advo-
cates of free trade advance against government interference is an objection to
the government's introducing inequalities by helping one economic group as
against the others by means of tariffs or other forms of preference which would
in effect destroy the "freedom" of trade.39 Yet the present constitutional doc-
trine of laissez faire has included among those rights of person and property
which are entitled to the protection of government both expectations of gain
from trade and the freedom to make bargains, without distinguishing between
gains and bargains arising from a mutual conferring of benefits among free
agents, and those accruing fortuitously to one party in an "unfree" trade situa-
tion-from a superiority of bargaining position secured through accidents of
time, place, or circumstance.'4°
In the second place, there is a more serious objection to the adoption of
laissezfaire. Even by its chief proponents, the doctrine is advocated merely as
an economic expedient for achieving a maximum of national wealth, and not
as a final determinant of public policy. While an economist might properly
consider the maximization of national wealth his goal, and leave the question
of the use of his discoveries to statesmen, still for a statesman the final deter-
minant of policy must be the peace and security of the people. The security
of person and possessions which is a constitutional guarantee in a democratic
state is an expression of this ultimate policy. It has been observed, however,
'39 For example, see the discussion of "monopolies" in Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations,
Bk. IV, chs. 7, 8: especially vol. 2, pp. 126 ff. (Everyman ed. igio). Cf. discussion of James v. -
Commonwealth, p. 633 supra.
140 For example, it is scarcely through the pure merit of their service that a group of employ-
ment bureaus in a given area, charging uniform rates, is able 'to command high prices. Cf.
Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) (held a deprivation of liberty and property for a
state to regulate the rates charged by employment bureaus). This constitutional guarantee
of "property rights" contrasts with the development in common law and equity courts of a
tendency to disallow "property rights" secured fortuitously. See Woodward, Quasi Con-
tracts §§ 8, 21-31 (1913).
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that the judiciary has included certain liberties in respect to commercial ac-
tivity-whether or not they promote ultimate peace and security-among the
rights whose claims to protection from interference are absolute;'4' and has
introduced further obstructions to the control of nationwide economic activities
through a geographical conception of "local" matters. 42 The result of the latter
conception has been the notion of "states' rights" which some groups in the
United States are now seeking to change by means of a redistribution of state
and federal powers.
It seems evident, however, from the fact that widely differing constitutional
provisions have been uniformly construed in such a way as to achieve laissez
faire-whether on grounds of "states' rights" or "freedom of trade" or "depri-
-cation of 'property' "--that the notion of "states' rights" is only one of the
difficulties to be overcome; and that a separation of personal from economic
interests is almost a condition precedent to an effective attack on laissezfaire.
It should be evident that any attempt to control economic matters, by redefini-
tion of states' rights or by any other method, is likely to meet with strong oppo-
sition based on the desire for security of personal interests.43 Whether this
resistance be encountered in the form of opposition to the adoption of the pro-
posal or in the form of judicial misconstruction after it is adopted, the ultimate
result is the same.
SCALING-DOWN OF ARREARAGES ON CUMULATIVE
PREFERRED STOCK
Ever since cumulative preferred stock came into fashion, common share-
holders have been faced with the dismalprospect produced by accumulations of
unpaid dividends so large that normal earnings cannot be expected to make up
past arrearages for many years. In such situations, unless some settlement can
be made with preferred shareholders, the value of the common shares as income-
yielding securities is very small. This problem is most acute at the end of a
period of business depression when common shareholders, actuated by a desire
to share in the profits of the more hopeful future, seek to effect a reorganization
of the capital structure of the corporation so as to reduce or eliminate the prior
141 See p. 627 supra. :42 See p. 629 supra.
r43 Thus a successful drive against the proposed child labor amendment proceeded by con-
vincing many farmers that their children would be unable to help on the farm if the amendment
were adopted. The Child Labor Amendment, 9 Social Serv. R. 107 (1935). The possibility of
such confusion arises in the ambiguity of the term "labor," which has both economic and per-
sonal significations. It can represent (i) a "commodity" which is sold and purchased; or (2)
any expenditure of energy in everyday activity. The experience of Australia with § 51 (xxxv)
suggests an alternative to a grant of power over some subject-matter, such as "conditions of
labor," "production," etc. If, instead, an amendment should grant power to govern the rela-
tions of certain classes of persons, and if the relations chosen to define these classes were eco-
nomic-e.g., "employers and employees" or "vendors and purchasers"--the ambiguity of the
principal terms might be partially eliminated.
